The Ideal University Model: Which are the Key Characteristics that Explain the Persistency of Extreme Faculty Induced System Failures?
Introduction
Most institution, including educational institutions, have a very clear redress and appeal process to deal with problems arising during their normal operations. The redress process explains in detail the different steps to be followed in case existing rules governing the working of the institution are not properly followed. Moreover, in case that complainants feel they have been mistreated during the redress process, there is usually an appeal venue available. This appeal venue clearly describes the options that the appeal body has to respond in case the complainant has truly been mistreated during the redress process. Usually, there are at least two options available to appeal bodies to remedy issues arising from true appeal complaints. One is to provide an internal solution to solve the problem and the other is to provide a fair retribution to mitigate the situation in question. For example, in the case of universities, the remedies available to deal with true academic appeals are to enforce an institutional solution that resolves the problem or to grant the academic standing that fits the circumstances.
A matter of duty
It is the duty of each university official responsible for investigating appeals during the redress process to act quickly and fairly to solve the problem if the evidence suggest so regardless of who according to the investigation is responsible. However, under an extreme faculty induced system failure, these officials may purposely choose not to perform their duties.
Moreover, it is the duty of the highest institutional body reviewing the redress appeal to provide a fair remedy when it determines that the complainant has been mistreated during the redress process. Hence, under an extreme faculty induced system failure, this highest appeal body may too purposely choose not to perform its duties.
A matter of lack of accountability threats
Extreme faculty induced system failures raises issues of internal and external enforcement of accountability and of fairness. University officials see no problem acting against student's rights under these circumstances as they see no accountability threats internally. They are policing themselves. On the other hand, university officials do not see external accountability threats as important deterrent mechanisms as external bodies are not perceived as representing an academic threat to their inappropriate decisions. In other words, decisions from external review bodies such as Ombudsman's offices and legal courts will most likely be in the institutional domain regardless of the academic ordeal imposed on students who fulfilled their duties. Ombudsman's offices and legal courts are not expected to enter into the academic domain of recommending the granting of an academic standing that fits the circumstances. The low likelihood that an external reviewer will enter into the academic domain of the university, which is the domain that would be the fairer to the student, is one of the factors encouraging university officials to purposely violate their duties.
The goals of this paper
This paper has three goals. One goal is to provide a qualitative comparative framework that can be used to represent and describe the process through which the extreme faculty induced university system failure operates in practice, both internally and externally. The second goal is to use the implications of this operative process to point out the key aspects or characteristics that seem to be necessary for this process to persist for long periods of time. And the third goal is to provide some key suggestions related to where true student power and pressure is needed to unlock this type of extreme problems as soon as the complaint is file.
Methodology
First, the ideal university model and the extreme faculty induced university system failure are defined. Second, this faculty induced failure model is used to show that under this failure, following the existing redress processes at the university leads to the total bureaucratisation of this failure. After this, it is shown that the highest appeal body at the university has the incentives to leave the bureaucratised academic problem unresolved as resolving it may lead to accepting responsibility and lost of university reputation. Then, it is shown that when facing true unfair academic dismissals, external monitoring agencies like Ombudsman offices and legal courts do not appear comfortable recommending solutions that fits the extreme circumstances created by extreme faculty induced system failures such as the granting of the academic standing that fits the circumstances. Then the key characteristics that appear to allow this problem to persist are highlighted. And finally, some conclusions and recommendations are provided.
Defining the ideal university model
The necessary and sufficient condition for an ideal university(U*) to exist is that both faculty members(P*) and students(E*) must fulfil their academic and non-academic duties at the same time, which can be expressed as follows:
1) U* = P*.E*
Defining the extreme faculty induced system failure
The necessary and sufficient condition for a faculty induced system failure(U1*) to be present is when specific faculty members(p1*) fully fail their academic and non-academic duties while specific students(E1*) fully fulfil their academic and non-academic duties as shown below:
2) U1* = p1*.E1*
To facilitate the presentation, it will be assumed that faculty member 1(p1*) failed fully his academic and non-academic duties and that student member 1(E1*) fully fulfilled his/her academic and non-academic duties under this specific type of faculty induced system failure(U1*).
Internal duty and accountability issues
Once the extreme faculty induced system failure stated above(U1*) is in place, the ingredients for internal duty and accountability failures are created as higher level officials who investigate will find no incentives to solve the problem. The inaction of the bureaucrats after investigation leads to what it is called here, the redress process effect and the Senate Appeal effect, which are described in detailed below.
The redress process effect
The redress process effect refers to the increased bureaucratisation of the student complaint as the number of appeals increases. The redress process effect when dealing with extreme faculty induced system failures can be easily appreciated when looking at one appeal after another as follows:
Problem locking up effect
When the first appeal is made, an investigation take place under the responsibility of faculty member(P2), who has the power to resolve the problem, which is expressed below:
3) P2(U1*) = P2(p1*.E1*)
As it can be seen in the formula above, the investigating faculty member(P2) can easily determine that he is dealing with a true faculty induced failure that may affect the reputation of his faculty or department because faculty member 1(p1*) has failed his duties while the student 1(E1*) has fulfilled his duties. Notice that official P2 has four options: to make failing faculty members accountable for their actions and to support the student to complete or to make failing faculty members accountable and still not support the student to completion or not to make failing faculty members accountable and support the student to complete or not to make failing faculty accountable and not support the student to completion. It can be seen that the first option is unbiased; that second and the third options are partially biased; and that the fourth option is totally biased. Under the circumstances created by the extreme faculty induced system failure, the investigating official(p2) most likely will chose the fourth option and do nothing to resolve the problem knowing that by doing that he is violating fully his duty to act and actually joining in the faculty induced system failure, which leads to the problem locking effect indicated below:
4) p2.U1* = p2.p1*.E1*
The problem re-locking effect
Later appeals and investigations made by faculty member P3, P4,...Pn, lead to similar conclusions and decisions as those reached by the first investigator(P2), and they also decide not to act, which is expressed in the next formula:
5) pn...p4.p3.p2.U1* = pn...p4.p3.p2.p1*.E1*
The collusion of all investigating officials with the officials responsible for the original faculty induced system failure leads to a total bureaucratisation of the problem as stated below:
6) B1* = pi*.E1*;
Where: B1 = bureaucratic process # 1
pi* = pn...p4.p3.p2.p1 = faculty collusion
The following aspects can be mentioned about the implications of formula 6: there is no incentive for any faculty member to solve the problem or stop the process as there is no academic reason to request the withdrawal of the student; and the student lies powerless stocked in the middle of the faculty induced failure and collusion. The only way the student can stop the process is by requesting his own withdrawal to the appropriate university body, and only by doing this can the student later proceed with a formal appeal to the university senate. You can not file an appeal if you have not yet received a reason to appeal, and the nature of the failure in formula 6 indicates that unless you request your own withdrawal you will never have a reason to appeal. The only recourse the faculty member responsible for requesting and granting student withdrawals is to get an academic reason at all cost since he or she will not be willing to recognise that the student request for withdrawal is due to the facing of an extreme faculty induced system failure, but formula 6 does not lie.
The Senate appeal effect
The student acting in good faith knows that his or her last recourse is the university senate(S) who has the mandate to investigate and the power to unlock the totally bureaucratised problem that is now in their hands, as shown in the formula below:
7) S(B1*) = S(pi*.E1*)
Now, the Senate investigation of the problem(S(B1*) again leads to the conclusion that all faculty members in charge of the redress process(pi*) failed their duties and have colluded to lock the problem they investigated and that the student fulfilled his/her duties fully. Notice that the Senate(S) now has two options to deal with the consequences of this extreme failure on the student: to create the institutional conditions to support the student to complete his or her academic work and make failing faculty members accountable for their actions or in the absence of a fair institutional solution, grant the academic standing the fits the circumstances. However, when facing extreme faculty induced system failure, the Senate(s) may choose neither, and dismiss the appeal to avoid fair action, which represent a full failure of duties and another collusion.
Now, the Senate(S) is not just facing a threat to the reputation of all the officials involved and their faculties, but a threat to the reputation of the university system too. Hence, under these circumstances, the Senate(s) too may decide not to resolve the problem and dismiss a true academic appeal all together regardless of the evidence. The Senate(s) dismissal of a true academic appeal leads to the second bureaucratisation of the problem, which is shown below:
8) B2* = s(pi*.E1*)
Notice that even though there is not academic problem involved in this extreme faculty induced system failure as the student fully performed his academic and non academic duties(E1*), the Senate(s) notice of dismissal will be frame as it there was an academic problem as they know that external monitoring agencies such as Ombudsman's offices and legal courts have a very common tendency to avoid venturing into academic domains.
External duty and accountability issues
It is usually expected by students acting in good faith that when the evidence supports the existence of a bureaucratised faculty induced system failures, external monitoring bodies such as ombudsman's offices and the legal courts will be there to enforce the academic appeal obligations of the university regardless of the type of remedy that fits the circumstances. However, in reality, regardless of the evidence both external monitoring bodies will try to avoid entering in the academic domain as much as possible, which is a situation that dilutes the fear that university officials may have when on purpose they choose not to solve the faculty induced system failure.
The recommendations available to the ombudsman
When the student presents an appeal complaint to the Ombudsman office(O), which has the duty to investigate unfair and biased administrative decisions made by specific decision-making bodies, again an independent investigation is carried out as shown below:
9) O(B2*) = O(s(pi*.E1*))
The investigation will now show that all faculty official involves(pi*) and the senate(s) have failed their duties and that the student had fulfilled them. Under these conditions, the Ombudsman has two unbiased options: to recommend that faculty officials that failed their duties be made accountable and that fair institutional solutions to permit the student to formalise his/her academic goals be created or to recommend that the university must grant the academic standing that fits the circumstances if the evidence suggest that no grounds for a fair institutional solution exist then.
Institutional accountability for failing duties based on formula 9 suggests that the fairest recommendation that the Ombudsman(O) can make is the second one: that the student should be granted the academic standing that fits the circumstances as in this type of system failure the dismissal of the student appeal by the Senate has been done for the sole purpose of avoiding to comply with their appeal duties as this extreme system failure has left them with no other fair institutional solution available. However, despite the degree of the violation of the rights of the student and the negative ordeal endured as shown in formula 10, the Ombudsman(o) will avoid making such a recommendation. The Ombudsman(o) will prefer instead to seek the recommendation of an institutional solution regardless of the additional unfairness that this decision may place on the student. On the top of this, even if the Ombudsman(o) recommends that the academic standing must be granted, his/her recommendations are non-binding, which is shown below:
10) o(B2*) = o(s(pi*.E1*))
The non-binding nature of the Ombudsman's recommendations and the low likelihood that the Ombudsman(o) will make the academic recommendation that fits the extreme circumstances lead to the third wave of bureaucratisation of the problem as university officials can choose to implement or not those recommendations, as indicated below:
11) B3* = o(s(pi*.E1*))
The recommendations available to legal courts
Assuming that the Ombudsman decided to recommend a specific institutional solution designed to solve the problem instead of the academic solution, but the university chooses not to implement it, then an appeal can be brought to a legal court(L).
Appeals to legal courts(L) will also lead to a review of the situation, and again the courts will reach similar conclusions as the bodies that have investigated before: the university has totally failed its duties and the student has fulfilled his or her duties, which is stated below:
12) L(B3*) = L(o(s(pi*.E1*)))
Again, the two most appropriate options or remedies available to legal courts(L) are the same: to recommend faculty accountability and the creation of an institutional solution to get the student to formalise his/her work or to recommend the direct granting of the academic standing.
Given the situation in formula 12, the fairest ruling the court(L) should enforce too is the granting of the academic standing that fits the circumstances because of the seriousness and the length of the extreme faculty induced system failure endured by the student, yet this may be the less likely recommendation. Legal courts(L) also tend to avoid entering in the academic domain of universities even though it is shown in formula 12 that there has not been academic problem in the first place.
Hence, the involvement of the legal court(L) may lead to enforcing the accountability of failing faculty members and officials and to a binding institutional solution that adds to the unfairness endured by the student as the positive academic environment to complete no longer exist, and this represent the fourth wave of bureaucratisation of the problem, as shown below:
Key characteristics that allow this type of failure to persist
From the discussion above, it can be pointed out that there are at least three main aspects that are necessary for this faculty induced system failure to persist, which are: a breakdown of internal accountability policies; the low perceived risk of facing academic responsibilities when facing revisions done by external monitoring bodies; and the individual nature in which the implications of the student ordeal are handled.
Breakdown of internal accountability
Faculty members are not afraid of any accountability procedure and enforcement internally as indicated in the different formulas. Had the first faculty member responsible for the first appeal in formula 3 performed his/her duties, the problem would not have been locked: the institutional solution could have been the removal the faculty members that failed their duties and replace them with new ones. If any other official responsible for resolving appeals in formula 4 to 8, including Senate officials would have performed their duties, fair institutional solutions could have been found, and enforced. Yet, they all failed their duties and colluded to avoid the resolution of the problem as shown by the formulas. Notice that the collusion of failing officials moves from inside out, from the root to the top.
Un-threatening external monitoring reviews
University officials do not expect the ombudsman's office and the legal courts to be meddling with their academic domain even when the evidence indicates that they should. Formula 9 to 13 indicates that Ombudsman and legal courts should enter the academic domain due to the biased nature of extreme faculty induced system failures, yet they most likely will avoid this route, sending still more wrong messages to university officials to continue their unethical practices. Notice again that the bureaucratisation of the problem moves from inside out too, from internal problem to external problem.
The lack of true student power and solidarity
Students are forced to face the consequences of extreme faculty induced system failure as individual students. Notice, that the student E1* despite of being the victim, it the passive element in the bureaucratic problem as seen in all formulas above as internal and external forces dealing with this faculty induced system failure act without a true regard for the student best interest.
As seen in all equations from 2 to 13, the student(E1*) is brought through all this ordeal alone and he or she is constantly stocked to each of the formula as an individual only. If there was a true powerful student structure(E2, E3,...En) with specific goals of supporting the student(E1) enduring this type of system failure and to enforce university accountability and full respect to student rights, the problem could be unlocked at any level of appeal, specially at the root, as shown below:
14) E2.E3...Enp2U1* = p2.p1*.E1*.E2.E3...En
In this case, as student solidarity increases(E2,E3,...En), the chances of unlocking and resolving the problem also increases, specially when all students(Ei) push for the resolution of the problem and the upholding of the student rights and academic appeals laws as shown below:
15) E2.E3...Enp2U1*= p2.p1*.Ei*
As it can be seen above, student power(Ei*) may make the investigating official(p2) to fulfil its duties of making faculty member p1 accountable for his/her failures, and in doing so solving the problem preventing the student(E1*) from completing his/her program. Hence, student power would make sure that the sustainability of the university system is fully restored, and the structure of the ideal university(U*) be claimed again, as indicated below:
16) U* = Pi*Ei*
Hence, under the ideal university structure(U*), all faculty members(Pi*) and all students(Ei*) are responsible for ensuring the sustainability of the system and the respect of duty and accountability laws.
Conclusions
The faculty induced system failure is a threat to all students as each student has an equal probability of falling within the domain of this problem. Under present conditions, once a student is locked up in this problem, it can not get out as shown in the different formulas; and he or she will be dragged through the redress process until he or she quits. And if he or she does not quit, the framework above shows that under the faculty induced system failure, the student should not expect the university senate or ombudsman's offices or legal courts to enforce the fairest solution available, and less, to enforce his or her best interest.
The discussion above shows that three of the necessary conditions for the faculty induced system failure to persist are lack of internal accountability threats, lack of external accountability threats, and the individualisation of the negative situation being faced by the student locked up within this system failure. In order to make university officials responsible for their actions, there is a need to make sure that internal accountability policies are enforced beginning at the top and moving down to the root so the message is clear; there is need to advocate for involvement of ombudsman's offices within the academic domain when dealing with these types of failures so this type of external monitoring becomes a real threat to the academic domain of university officials; there is a need to advocates for legal courts too to enter into academic domains when dealing with extreme failures, again to make this type of legal actions a threat to the academic domain of university officials; and finally, student organisations must make sure that bodies overseeing appeals are made accountable for their biased actions.
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